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ABSTRACT
This study examines the enforcement of desegregation orders
mandated under state law as a result of the Supreme Court’s handling of
school desegregation cases at the federal level. The Article tracks the
development of school desegregation cases starting shortly before Brown
v. Board of Education and continues through the recent voluntary school
desegregation case, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1. The Article establishes four distinct generations of
school desegregation cases at the federal level and determines that the
political tides created, in large part, by the U.S. Supreme Court’s handling
of federal school desegregation cases severely limited efforts to pursue
state-mandated school desegregation in the state of Pennsylvania, where
the Pennsylvania Human Relation Act required the state to remedy even
de facto school desegregation in Philadelphia. The study reaches this
conclusion after bringing to bear the fact that the Philadelphia School
Desegregation Case also has four generations of court rulings, and those
rulings align temporally and politically with the four generations of federal
school desegregation cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the federal government’s rhetoric, it has been less than
adamant about its commitment to desegregate the nation’s public schools.
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Although Brown v. Board of Education1 is held as the holy grail of
desegregation cases, Brown I’s progeny has betrayed the milestone in race
relations (at least in public schools) set forth by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1954. In Brown I, the Court ruled unequivocally that
segregation would no longer be tolerated in public education.2 However,
Brown I’s promise has eroded substantially over time. In particular, the
role of the federal courts in enforcing the nation’s ban on segregation in
public schools is more questionable now than ever before.3 Since the
Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley,4 few, if any, Supreme Court cases
have advanced the cause of desegregation in a meaningful way. Further,
the Court appears to have redoubled its efforts at retracting the
advancements of the civil rights movement as those advancements relate
to the desegregation of public schools. In the 1990s, the Court began to
unceremoniously bow out of its mandate to assure that public schools were
desegregated,5 and as recently as the mid-2000s, the Court’s resistance to
school desegregation manifested itself through the rejection of efforts
aimed at the voluntary integration of public schools.6
This study examines the shifting role of the federal courts on the
holdings of school desegregation cases brought under state law.
Specifically, this study aligns with the extraordinarily long Philadelphia
School Desegregation Case (1972–2009), a desegregation case brought
under state law, with the various eras of federal school desegregation case
law. This study argues that, based on the results of this Pennsylvania case
study, the holdings in school desegregation cases at the federal level have
preempted—politically rather than legally—states’ abilities to achieve
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See id. at 495; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (stating
that courts should pursue integration with the public interest in mind); Steven L. Nelson, Different
Script, Same Caste in the Use of Passive and Active Racism: A Critical Race Theory Analysis of the
(Ab)use of “House Rules” in Race-Related Education Cases, 22 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST.
297, 301–02 (2016) [hereinafter A Critical Race Theory Analysis] (arguing that the Court provided
more protection for White Americans than for Black Americans in Brown II).
3. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, E PLURIBUS… SEPARATION 78–79 (2012)
[hereinafter THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT], http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12education/integration-and-diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus...separation-deepening-doublesegregation-for-more-students/orfield_epluribus_revised_omplete_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D4RB6CE].
4. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See discussion of Milliken I, infra note
21 and accompanying text.
5. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490–91 (1992); see also Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub.
Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991).
6. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 702–03 (2007);
see also Erica Frankenberg et al., Fighting “Demographic Destiny”: A Legal Analysis of Attempts of
the Strategies White Enclaves Might Use to Maintain School Segregation, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J.
39 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court, although rejecting the voluntary integration efforts in
Seattle and Louisville, reaffirmed diversity as a compelling state interest).
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school desegregation through state-based legislation. Thus, even
well-intentioned states enacting legislation and remedies for school
desegregation may fall victim to the political tides set in motion by the
federal courts. Although legal scholars often cite Sheff v. O’Neill7 as
evidence of states’ abilities to remedy school desegregation, the
Philadelphia School Desegregation Case warns of potential dangers in
relying solely on state law-based attacks of school desegregation.
First, this study discusses the federal courts’ shunting of efforts to
desegregate schools. Second, it considers the facts of the Philadelphia
School Desegregation Case. Third, it explores the similarities of the
federal school desegregation cases and the Philadelphia School
Desegregation Case, with particular attention paid to the more-thancoincidental similar time points for changes in the course of school
desegregation at each level. Finally, this study considers whether the
impact of federal case law on state case law may be a harbinger of things
to come for future litigants pursuing educational equity through state lawbased efforts to desegregate public schools.
I. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:
TWO STEPS FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK?
Immeasurable research has assessed the role of the federal courts in
school desegregation. Legal scholars’ fascination with the federal courts’
impact on movements toward the desegregation of the nation’s public
schools is well placed, because a substantial portion of watershed cases
mandating movements toward educational equity through the
desegregation of public schools has occurred at the behest of the federal
judiciary. Considering the relatively large number of federal court cases
(as compared to state court cases) that have addressed educational equity
through desegregation, it is proper and necessary to evaluate the role of
the federal courts in desegregation in various eras.
The first generation of school desegregation cases occurred between
the 1930s and mid-1950s.8 The second generation of school desegregation
cases occurred between the mid-1950s and the early-to-mid 1970s.9 The
third generation of school desegregation cases occurred during the early-

7. In Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that the state needed to take measures
to integrate its public schools).
8. McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950);
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
9. E.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958); Griffin v. Cty. Schl. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Green v.
Cty. Schl. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ.,
401 U.S. 1 (1971).
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to-mid 1970s until the beginning of the twenty-first century.10 Finally, the
fourth and current generation of school desegregation cases is occurring
contemporaneously with this study.11 The next part of this study will
identify the pertinent cases and the driving phenomena belonging to each
generation of school desegregation cases.
A. Before Brown I and Brown II: The First Generation of School
Desegregation Cases
Before the Supreme Court’s consideration of the segregation of
Black and White students in public schools, federal courts had already
considered the segregation of immigrants,12 as well as English language
learners.13 In the 1940s and early 1950s, the Court set the stage for the
desegregation of public primary and secondary schools and sent a firm
message that neither state-sponsored law schools14 nor graduate schools15
could deny an applicant admission on race alone. Unanimous Court
decisions, involving extraordinary efforts at consensus building, opened
educational opportunities previously limited for, if not totally foreclosed
to, Black students.16 The Court’s period of unanimity continued with
Brown I.17 In Brown I, the Court explicitly and unequivocally overturned
the “separate but equal” doctrine18 of Plessy v. Ferguson;19 Brown I
mandated the replacement of the “separate but equal” policy20 with one
10. E.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237 (1991); Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717
(1974); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Co., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); United States v. Scotland Neck
City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); see also
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
11. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
12. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals would prevent a school district from
segregating students with “Mexican blood.” See Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange Cty. v. Mendez,
161 F.2d 774, 780–81 (9th Cir. 1923).
13. The United States Supreme Court would prevent the state of Nebraska from banning the
teaching of foreign languages to students who had not passed eighth grade. See Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
14. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (preventing the state of Texas from creating a
law school for its Black students when the creation of that law school was for the purpose of avoiding
the integration of its all White law school).
15. McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents, 339 U.S 637, 642 (1950) (following its Texas decision with
a unanimous decision holding that the same constitutional provision forbade the state of Oklahoma
from mandating that a Black student, admitted to graduate school, be required to sit outside of the
classroom—although adjacent to the classroom—to maintain segregated learning environments for
Black and White students).
16. See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635;
McLaurin, 339 U.S at 642.
17. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Id. at 494–95.
19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
20. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494–95.
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that explicitly required school districts to desegregate their public
schools.21 Brown I and its remedies version, Brown v. Board of Education
II—in which the Court told school districts that they must desegregate with
“all deliberate speed”22—stand among the most prolific and heralded
Court decisions establishing equity and equality (as defined by school
desegregation) for Black students in the United States. However, some
scholars have argued against such a solitary and restrictive method of
achieving educational equity and therefore are much less praiseworthy of
society’s interpretation of the school desegregation efforts of Brown I and
its progeny.23
B. Desegregation or Bust: The Second Generation of
School Desegregation Cases
Soon after Brown I and Brown II, in Cooper v. Aaron, the Court
soundly rejected the state’s argument that the desegregation of the state’s
public schools was not feasible.24 Throughout the 1960s, the Court
continued to unanimously rule in favor of school desegregation and
educational equity for minority students.25 In Griffin v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, after the district delivered vouchers to
White families to attend private schools in lieu of attending public schools
to avoid desegregation, the Court banned the closing of Prince Edward
County’s public schools.26 In 1968, in Green v. County School Board of
New Kent County, a unanimous Court required school districts to take
affirmative acts to desegregate public schools by establishing the Green
factors (a desegregation checklist) that determined whether meaningful
desegregation had occurred in a given school district.27 Until the early
1990s, school districts were required to fulfill these requirements in

21. Gary Orfield, Prologue: Lessons Forgotten, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION 1, 1–6 (Erica
Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2007) (discussing how school desegregation cases had national
affect and effect, but the primary area of focus in desegregating schools was in the American South.
Northerner segregation was, to some extent, not viewed as a problem).
22. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
23. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); A Critical Race Theory Analysis, supra note 2, at
301–02 (arguing that the forwardness and exceptionalism associated with Brown II is a fictitious
creation of White America).
24. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16–20 (1958).
25. E.g., Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); see also
Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 441–42 (1968).
26. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 230–31.
27. Green, 391 U.S. at 441–42. The Green factors are the racial proportions of students, faculty
and staff assigned to specific schools as well as absolute equality of transportation, facilities, and
extracurricular activities. Id. at 435.
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relative temporal proximity in order to end federal district court
supervision.28
C. An End to Affirmative Desegregation Attempts? The Third
Generation of School Desegregation Cases
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court began to show signs of
exhaustion with school desegregation. Although the Court began the
1970s with unanimous decisions,29 judicial decisions began to split, with
less of an effort toward consensus building than had occurred in the 1950s
and 1960s. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, a
unanimous Court upheld the busing of students to and from school as a
remedy for de jure segregation,30 while in Wright v. Council of Emporia
and United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, the unanimity
of the Court began to dissolve. In these two cases, proponents of school
desegregation avoided attempts to resegregate (or maintain segregation in)
public schools.31
The cracks in the former consensus finally became insurmountable
in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I).32 In Milliken I, the Court limited school
desegregation plans to districts previously guilty of de jure segregation.33
In this case, a majority of the Court used artificial and arbitrary geographic
boundaries to draw a line in the proverbial sand of desegregation. PostMilliken I, integration-minded school officials were constrained to pursue
equal educational opportunity while maintaining racial segregation, as
opposed to using desegregation to effectuate educational equity.34 After
Milliken I, state statutes pursuing integration became ineffective.
Moreover, the guidance from Milliken II and other lawsuit remedies aimed
at increasing financial capital for struggling predominantly minority
school districts continued to be of little to no avail.35

28. See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991); Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–90 (1992); Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1 (Gary Orfield et al.
eds., 1996) [hereinafter Turning Back to Segregation].
29. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
30. Id. at 30.
31. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Bd.
of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972). In both Wright and Scotland Neck, all justices agreed in the result of
the case, despite the fact that four justices in each case submitted varying rationales for reaching the
holding in each case. Id. Both cases involved the attempted creation of splinter districts in the wake of
mandatory desegregation orders. Id.
32. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
33. Id. at 761.
34. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977).
35. Alison Morantz, Money and Choice in Kansas City, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 241 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996).
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D. Moving Toward Resegregation: The Fourth Generation
of School Desegregation Cases
Although Milliken I was not strong enough to kill efforts at
desegregating the nation’s public schools, the 1990s saw the Court issue
multiple rulings that effectively ended affirmative efforts toward school
desegregation. Combined, Freeman v. Pitts36 and Board of Education of
Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell37 allowed school districts to
fulfill one Green factor at a time and to no longer be accountable to federal
courts upon the piecemeal fulfillment of the individual Green factors. As
the Court reneged on its promise to desegregate the nation’s public
schools, there was a simultaneous return to segregation. Research by the
UCLA Civil Rights Project indicates that the only period of substantial
school integration was the decade immediately following the enactment of
the civil rights legislation of the 1960s.38 This same research concluded
that schools became increasingly segregated in the 1980s;39 since then,
efforts at school desegregation have slowed, if not completely stagnated
or regressed. In particular, only the most segregated schools in the
country—those that are almost exclusively filled with students of one
race—have seen significant progress; the integration of all other schools
has severely faltered since the 1980s.40 This finding is unsettling because
a plethora of literature supports the notion that students in integrated
schools have better academic, social, and occupational trajectories than
students in segregated schools.41
II. STATE COURT INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:
THE CASE OF PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION V. SCHOOL
DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA
Because of their nature, school desegregation cases tend to stretch
over years, and often decades. The contentious and politically charged
issues of school and neighborhood segregation engender protracted
debate; indeed, intentionally lengthening a case may even be a strategy to
delay an unpopular decision or outlast one’s opponents. Moreover, it takes
time to discern the extent, causes, and possible solutions to segregation in
a community. Even when a decision is reached, it takes years to ensure
that the remedy is effective. In fact, some desegregation cases last such a
36. 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992).
37. 498 U.S. 237, 245 (1991).
38. THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 3.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Id.
41. E.g., Erica Frankenberg, School Integration—The Time is Now, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION
7 (Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2007).
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long time that the length of the case influences its trajectory, leaving
desegregation cases subject to outside influences. Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission (PHRC) v. School District of Philadelphia (SDP)
is such a case, spanning nearly forty years before the parties could reach a
resolution. The exceptional length of the case is intriguing in itself, but it
also became a critical factor in its evolution. It changed the goal from
desegregating Philadelphia’s public schools to providing equal
educational opportunities for all students in Philadelphia’s public schools,
even if those opportunities were provided in segregated schooling
environments.
A. Contextualizing the Case
In fact, PHRC v. SDP arose out of the indecision of another long
case. From 1961 to 1971, Chisholm v. Board of Public Education worked
its way from state court to federal court, finally ending when a panel of
federal judges in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals debated whether the
SDP stood in violation of its own nondiscrimination policy.42 When the
federal judge dismissed the case without prejudice in the mid-1960s, the
PHRC refiled in state court in the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania.43 This time, the PHRC chose not to pursue the case under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but instead
relied on a state statute: the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).44
The PHRA, passed in 1955, provided for state intervention to resolve
issues of de jure and de facto segregation.45 In addition, the PHRA
established the PHRC to resolve violations of the PHRA, including de
facto segregation46 in public schools.47
The Philadelphia School Desegregation Case spanned nearly forty
years, but scant attention was paid to school segregation when the case
was finally resolved. Instead, the PHRC and the SDP settled on a pledge
to improve school quality. Given the continuing segregation in
Philadelphia’s public schools, the case seems to have failed its original
promise of offering Philadelphia’s public school students a desegregated
42. Dale Mezzacappa, Phila. School Fight Difficult, Enduring, PHILLY.COM (July 11, 2004),
http://articles.philly.com/2004-07-11/news/25371735_1_Black-teachers-Black-students-Blackchildren [https://perma.cc/AV8Q-XQLM].
43. Id.
44. Id.; Pennsylvania Human Relations Act of 1955 (PHRA), Pub. L. No. 744, Pa. Laws 222
(codified as amended at 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951–963 (West 2017)).
45. Id.
46. In law, de facto segregation indicates segregation that is the result of purported individual
choices whereas de jure segregation indicates segregation that is the result of explicit government
policies that promote the alleged segregation.
47. See Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n (HRC I), 294 A.2d 410 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1972).
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education. As the case progressed, minority student enrollment increased
while White students left the district en masse, making desegregation
difficult to achieve.48 Table 1 displays Philadelphia’s changing
demographics over the course of the Philadelphia School Desegregation
Case.
Table 1
Racial/Ethnic Demographics Among Entire Population in
Philadelphia Since 195049
Year

White

Black

Asian

1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010

81.7
73.3
65.6
58.2
53.5
45.0
41.0

18.2
26.4
33.6
37.8
39.9
43.2
43.4

0.1
0.2
0.3
1.1
2.7
4.5
6.3

Of Latin@50
Origin
Negligible
Negligible
2.4
3.8
5.6
8.5
12.3

During each stanza of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case,
the broader national sentiments regarding school desegregation appear to
have affected its trajectory. In the 1970s, the PHRC found sympathetic
jurists and a relatively sympathetic public. Unfortunately, the SDP and the
PHRC failed to leverage that sympathy in order to reach an agreement to
integrate Philadelphia’s public schools. Then, in the 1980s, having missed
the pro-integration attitudes of the 1970s, the PHRC was met with
desegregation fatigue, if not open hostility, toward mandatory integration
plans. Judicial efforts at forcing the SDP to integrate failed, and the SDP’s
independent integration efforts resulted in further school segregation. The
1990s, fueled by new stakeholders holding even more hostility toward
desegregation, produced results not initially anticipated in the original
conceptualization of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case.
Finally, in the 2000s, desegregation fatigue allowed a settlement that fell
short of both desegregated schools and the quality education promised to
the SDP students.
48. See Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by
Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places
in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 76, 2005), https://www.census.gov/
population/www/documentation/twps0076/twps0076.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN9U-VETF].
49. Id. at 94 (Table 39).
50. The use of the @ symbol affords gender neutrality.
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B. Prior to the Mid-1970s: The Aggressive Years of State
Law-Based Desegregation in Philadelphia
The first major issue facing resolution of the Philadelphia School
Desegregation Case was whether the PHRC could legally target de facto
segregation.51 In a subsequent case, PHRC v. Uniontown Area School
District,52 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania argued that de facto
segregation in Pennsylvania was as important as de jure segregation.53
Agreeing with that contention, Judge Wilkinson of the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania clarified that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
could address issues of de facto segregation through state law— which it
had done through the PHRA.54
After the Pennsylvania state legislature passed legislation to rid the
state’s public schools of desegregation and made the PHRC responsible
for implementation, the PHRC was empowered to compel the school
district to remedy de facto segregation.55 According to Judge Wilkinson’s
opinion, the federal decisions had little to no effect on an enforcement
action properly brought by an appropriate party under the PHRA because
federal law did not ban state law from addressing desegregation that was
the result of explicit state policies.56
Notwithstanding Judge Wilkinson’s ultimate order enforcing the
PHRC’s order, the SDP refused to cooperate with the PHRC, leading to
another iteration of the case.57 According to the PHRC, the SDP failed to
furnish plans to rectify all or any indications of de facto segregation. The
PHRC argued that the SDP was unable to finance any plan that would
result in meaningful integration.58 The Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania dismissed this argument under the reasoning that a plan had
to be developed before the school district could place a meaningful price
tag on the plan.59 After developing a plan, the school district could then
appeal to the PHRC to accommodate the district’s inability to implement
the best possible integration plan.60 The court ordered the school district
51. HRC I, 294 A.2d at 411.
52. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Uniontown Area Sch. Dist., 313 A.2d 156, 170 (Pa. 1973)
(arguing that the PHRC had legislative authority to pursue the eradication of de facto segregation and
that the court was in no position to question the wisdom of the legislature’s actions that are properly
and constitutionally undertaken).
53. Id. at 162.
54. HRC I, 294 A.2d at 414.
55. Id. at 412–13.
56. Id.
57. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC II), 352 A.2d 200, 209 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976).
58. HRC I, 294 A.2d at 414.
59. Id. at 413.
60. Id.
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to make appropriate and compliant provisions to remedy its issues with
school segregation.61 Once again, the state court judges of Pennsylvania
expressed a sympathetic ear toward the PHRC and the PHRC’s efforts at
public school integration.
In contravention of the court’s previous order, by the late 1970s the
SDP had not developed adequate plans to integrate its schools. Therefore,
in the late 1970s, the PHRC sought another enforcement action from the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.62 The school district submitted
plans to the PHRC that rested almost entirely on a voluntary desegregation
effort—in clear violation of previous requests for long-term involuntary
reassignment.63 The school district also failed to provide any immediate
desegregation plans using involuntary reassignment. The SDP’s proposed
plans also excluded 91 of the 287 (or nearly a third of) Philadelphia
schools from its integration plans.64 The PHRC, but not the
Commonwealth Court, found the SDP’s plan unacceptable, especially
given the numerous extensions, delays, and misgivings previously found
in this case.65 The Commonwealth Court, though reliably sympathetic to
the PHRC, hinted in its opinion that the PHRC might have been
overreaching in enforcing the PHRA.66 Although the court acknowledged
the PHRC’s frustration, it was unwilling to make the leap to busing, an
unpopular option for both Blacks and Whites in Philadelphia.67
Additionally, the PHRC had argued that the voluntary nature of the school
district’s plan was reliant on the same human capital that initially
segregated the school district via housing.68 It made no sense to rely on
those same minds to overcome racial segregation.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
Commonwealth Court in the 1978 case, PHRC v. SDP.69 This installment
of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case resulted in the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania refusing the PHRC’s demands for
pairing of schools and busing under the theory that students in Philadelphia
needed some plan—even if not the perfect plan—to resolve issues with de
facto segregation.70 The PHRC was required, under this order, to wait until
the 1980s to institute another enforcement action if the school district’s
61. Id. at 414.
62. See HRC II, 352 A.2d 200.
63. Id. at 209.
64. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC III), 390 A.2d 1238 (Pa. 1978).
65. Id. at 1262.
66. See HRC III, 374 A.2d at 1016.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. HRC III, 390 A.2d at 1247.
70. Id. at 1250.
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plan did not produce more integrated schools.71 The move for school
desegregation in Philadelphia in the 1970s reflected broader national
trends. In the early 1970s, the courts sided solidly with those pursuing
desegregation of the Philadelphia public schools.72 As the decade
unfolded, the Philadelphia desegregation advocates faced some pushback,
although slightly behind the national backlash. This backlash, though new
from the courts, had existed for some time in the general population and
was becoming the new reality for advocates of school desegregation. The
1980s brought further backlash and, to some extent, signaled the end to
exclusively desegregation-oriented forces on the Commonwealth Court.
Although both the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued the SDP a reprieve, the
school district never made good on its promise to integrate its public
schools.73
C. Approaching and Navigating the 1980s: State Efforts at
Desegregation Falter in Philadelphia
If the mid-to-late 1970s, case law from the Philadelphia School
Desegregation Case was a reprieve for SDP (especially in that it required
that the PHRC give the SDP additional time to attempt to desegregate), the
1980s case law was nearly a dismissal of the school district’s duty to
desegregate the city’s public schools.74 While the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania sanctioned the voluntary integration plan in the 1970s,75 the
voluntary plan resulted in not simply a segregated school district, but in a
school district that in some ways was more segregated than the district
previously was.76 In fact, the voluntary integration plan resulted in no
schools becoming integrated and at least two formerly integrated schools
becoming segregated.77 While the school district had made some dubious
progress in integrating the schools, the PHRC, unlike the Commonwealth
Court, found the progress to be inadequate.78
Under previous court opinions in the 1970s, the Commonwealth
Court had approved the PHRC’s rule that a school’s population could not

71. Id.
72. E.g., HRC I, 294 A.2d 410, 414 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972); Pa. Human Relations Comm’n
v. Uniontown Area Sch. Dist., 313 A.2d 156, 170 (Pa. 1973).
73. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC IV), 443 A.2d 1343, 1344 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. HRC III, 390 A.2d 1238, 1252 (Pa. 1978).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1243.
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vary thirty percent above or below the city’s population.79 A school outside
of the thirty percent rule was considered segregated.80 Both the PHRC and
the school district advanced divergent measures of the voluntary
integration program’s success.81 Under both the PHRC’s 1968 and 1979
definitions, the SDP saw marginal gains in integrating the city’s public
schools.82 Under both of these methods of evaluation, the school district
saw around a one percent increase in integrated schools.83 The school
district argued, however, that it had made more impressive gains in
integration under its own definition. Tables 2–7 enable a comparison of
each definition’s change in integration.
Table 2
Schools Integrated Under the PHRC 1968 Definition
Year

Integrated
Schools

Total Schools

1977
1980

51
57

294
287

Percentage of
Schools in
Philadelphia
Integrated
17.3
19.9

Note. Under the PHRC’s 1978 definition of a segregated school, a
segregated school is a school where Black enrollment was not within thirty
percent of the average Black student enrollment in an SDP school.84
Table 3
Philadelphia Public School Students in Integrated Schools Under
the PHRC 1968 Definition
Year

Students in
Integrated
Schools

Total Students

1977
1980

38,644
40,180

250,932
224,339

Percentage of
Students in
Integrated
Schools
15.4
17.9

79. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Norristown Area Sch. Dist., 374 A.2d 671, 679 (Pa. 1977).
80. Id.
81. HRC IV, 443 A.2d 1343, 1344–45 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1344.
84. Id. at 1355.
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Table 4
Schools Integrated Under the PHRC 1979 Definition
Year

Integrated
Schools

Total Schools

1977
1980

30
37

294
287

Percentage of
Schools in
Philadelphia
Integrated
10.2
12.9

Note. Under the PHRC’s 1979 definition of a segregated school, a
segregated school is a school where less than twenty-five percent of the
students were White or less than forty percent of the students were Black
unless it contained more than twenty percent Latin@ enrollment. If
Latin@ enrollment was more than twenty percent, the school is deemed
segregated if either Blacks or Whites were less than twenty-five percent
enrollment.85
Table 5
Philadelphia Public School Students in Integrated Schools Under
the PHRC 1979 Definition
Year

Students in
Integrated
Schools

Total Students

1977
1980

23,705
26,453

250,932
224,339

Percentage of
Students in
Integrated
Schools
9.4
11.8

Table 6
Schools Integrated Under the School District 1978 Definition
Year

Integrated
Schools

Total Schools

1977
1980

54
79

294
287

85. Id. at 1345.

Percentage of
Schools in
Philadelphia
Integrated
18.4
27.5
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Note. Under the SDP’s 1978 definition of a segregated school, a
school with less than 25 percent or more than 75 percent White enrollment
would be considered segregated.86
Table 7
Philadelphia Public School Students in Integrated Schools Under
the PHRC 1979 Definition
Year

Students in
Integrated
Schools

Total Students

1977

43,593

250,932

Percentage of
Students in
Integrated
Schools
17.4

1980

62,255

224,339

27.8

If the Commonwealth Court, once solidly in the corner of integration,
had remained on the side of the PHRC, the court would have demanded
more of an effort from the school district. Instead, the takeaway from the
1982 installment of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case was that
the Commonwealth Court was no longer staunchly in favor of forced
desegregation. The court, despite evidence pointing to a lack of serious
effort to overcome de facto segregation, allowed another extension of the
timeline to remedy public school segregation in Philadelphia—one that
produced another voluntary plan for integration to begin in 1983, deemed
the 1983 Modified Plan.87
Regardless of the definition used,88 the court found the increase in
integrated schools misleading.89 The court found that no schools had
joined the rank of integrated schools.90 The percentage increase was
actually the result of seven schools closing and the students being
reassigned as a result, and two schools becoming more racially integrated
due to an increase in other minority students (namely Asians and Latin@s)
but not from an increase in White students attending the school.91 The
court, nevertheless, determined another extension of the deadline was

86. Id.
87. Id. at 1354.
88. See HRC IV, 390 A.2d 1238, 1262 (Pa. 1978); HRC III, 374 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1977); HRC I, 294 A.2d 410, 413–14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972); HRC II, 352 A.2d 200, 209 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976).
89. HRC IV, 443 A.2d 1343, 1352 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
90. Id.
91. See HRC IV, 443 A.2d at 1352; Table 1.
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necessary to fully desegregate Philadelphia’s public schools.92 In addition
to proving that desegregation was no longer as high of a priority for the
Commonwealth Court, the case also proved that the court was no longer
fully supportive of those seeking to integrate the public schools of
Philadelphia (even if the court was not in the corner of the anti-integration
factions, it was no longer reliably pro-integration).
The judicial actions of the Commonwealth Court during the 1980s
reflected the general national consensus of frustration with
integration-related actions. Evidence suggests that the order should have
better aligned with the desires of the PHRC because the court embraced a
plan that minimally decreased the number of schools that were racially
isolated; in fact, the number of schools that were racially isolated
increased. Instead, the court chose to grant the school district more years
to remedy the segregation-related issues previously facing Philadelphia’s
public schools and the segregation-related issues newly created by the
previous years of desegregation gone awry. The order from the early 1980s
held until the 1990s and resulted in jumpstarting the next trend: a
movement away from desegregation toward equal access to public
education, without regard to the delivery of those opportunities in
segregated educational environments. In other words, the case would
move from a Brown I and II-based effort into a Milliken II-based93 effort
in the next decade.
D. A New Judge and a New Case: The 1990s and an Opportunity
Missed for State Law-Based Desegregation in Philadelphia
As the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case moved into its third
decade, the PHRC appointed an Independent Settlement Team (the
Settlement Team) to assess the SDP’s progress toward desegregation.94
The Settlement Team’s report, released in 1992, confirmed that most SDP
schools were severely segregated.95 Moreover, the Settlement Team
concluded that the district had not effectively pursued or achieved
“maximum feasible desegregation.”96 Ultimately, the Settlement Team
recommended the use of busing to reassign students and foster racial
balance.97 Reinvigorated by the report, several representative parent
groups requested another hearing in April 1993 seeking either to force or
92. HRC IV, 443 A.2d at 1354.
93. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
94. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC V), 651 A.2d 177, 179 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1993).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 181.
97. Id. at 179–80.
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to prevent the SDP from implementing busing for integration.98 At this
point, ASPIRA officially joined the case as a plaintiff-intervenor.99
ASPIRA, an organization dedicated to developing educational and
leadership opportunities for Latin@ youth, brought to the case the force of
a national organization and a broader definition of minority youth who
could potentially benefit from the case’s resolution. From the beginning
of the case in the early 1970s to the turning point in the early 1990s, the
Latin@ proportion of the population had more than doubled; by the ending
of the case, the Latin@ proportion of the population had increased more
than five-fold.100 Together, the PHRC and ASPIRA argued that the SDP
had failed to achieve the maximum possible desegregation and that busing
was the best option.101
In response to the new efforts by the PHRC and ASPIRA, the SDP
attempted to bring contiguous suburban districts into the case, arguing that
a metropolitan strategy would be necessary to achieve desegregation, a
tactic that had been rebuffed by the federal court in Milliken I.102 The SDP
also requested to join the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Governor,
and the Pennsylvania Department of Education to the case, suggesting that
state-level political support would facilitate the funding, implementation,
and enforcement of desegregation plans.103 The SDP then sought
appropriate compromises with the PHRC, with both parties ultimately
aiming toward desegregation. Neither the petitioners nor the District yet
realized that a new judge, Judge Doris Smith, would completely redefine
the case in a matter of months.
In June 1993, Judge Smith granted the SDP’s request for a directed
verdict, concluding that the PHRC had “failed to demonstrate that
mandatory desegregation measures were feasible.”104 In her opinion,
Judge Smith cited Judge Wilkinson’s 1972 opinion105 as substantiation
that “it is the Commission which logically and legally bears the burden of
adducing evidence in support of its determinations as to the efficacy of a
plan devised by the District and as to the curative measures needed.”106
In contrast to earlier judges, who had generally ceded to the PHRC’s
judgment, Judge Smith demanded a higher burden of proof from the
PHRC. In doing so, she also established the Commonwealth Court as the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Table 1.
101. See Table 6.
102. HRC V, 651 A.2d 177, 182 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
103. Id. at 178.
104. Id. at 180.
105. HRC I, 294 A.2d 410, 414 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
106. HRC V, 651 A.2d at 181.
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final authority on the state of school segregation, rather than the PHRC.107
Ultimately, the PHRC could not meet Judge Smith’s higher standard.
Judge Smith faulted the PHRC for taking too long to alert the SDP of
continued segregation and for inappropriately estimating bus times.108
Moreover, Judge Smith held that the Commission’s recommendations
were based on unproven assumptions, concluding that
the Commission proffered no evidence in support of the proposition
that mandatory busing would effectuate further desegregation than
has been accomplished under the modified plan, and it neither proved
the feasibility of mandatory reassignment per busing nor any cause
and effect relationship between busing, if indeed it were feasible, and
increased desegregation.109

Thus, Judge Smith ruled that the Commission had failed to prove that the
SDP had not achieved maximum possible desegregation or that mandatory
busing was a feasible solution. Indeed, she adamantly declared that she
would “no longer consider mandatory busing as an issue in this case.”110
Finally, Judge Smith denied the request to involve suburban school
districts, the Governor, and the Department of Education.111 She cited
earlier opinions from when the District had attempted to join other parties
and concluded that the requested parties were neither indispensable nor
necessary.112 Although Judge Smith left the door open slightly for another
attempt, she stated, “[i]t should be noted that neither the District nor the
Commission appealed this Court’s refusal to order creation of a
metropolitan school district.”113 In either case, precedent in other northern
urban districts suggested that the inclusion of suburban districts was
unlikely to succeed.114 The fact that Judge Smith had imposed a heightened
burden of proof made it even more unlikely that she would pursue a radical
or unprecedented restructuring of the district.
Hence, by June 1993, the desegregation case had effectively
disappeared. Overturning decades of prior opinions, Judge Smith declared
107. Id. at 180–83.
108. Id. at 180–83.
109. Id. at 183.
110. Id. at 185.
111. Id. at 177.
112. Id. at 183.
113. Id. at 183–84. (citing the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case’s origins from as early
as 1972 as method to avoid establishing a metropolitan-wide school district for the sake of
desegregation and arguing that the PHRC’s and/or the SDP’s failure to appeal the 1972 ruling banning
a metropolitan school district was sound reasoning for avoiding the establishment of a metropolitan
school district two decades later). Judge Smith’s 1993 opinion does not consider the vastly different
circumstances—especially the shifting demographic statistics—in her refusal to establish a
metropolitan-wide school district. Id.
114. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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the court the final authority on the extent of desegregation, introduced a
higher standard of proof for the petitioners, dismissed busing as a
possibility, and denied the involvement of suburban districts or state
agencies.115 This left the petitioners with a quality of education case; the
only pathway to educational equity in the SDP would be equal access to
educational opportunities, even if those opportunities were, in fact,
segregated.116 Judge Smith’s apparent exchange of desegregation in favor
of separate but equal educational opportunities117 was not just a betrayal
of the spirit of the PHRA,118 but also stood in direct opposition to the
Court’s orders in Brown I119 and its progeny.120 In fact, at the end of her
opinion, Judge Smith specifically noted that the District’s modified plan
included goals aimed at educational improvement, and she detailed the
racial achievement gaps in the District. The judge did not mention
desegregation.121 As such, Judge Smith established her openness to
facilitating a case for quality education and therefore shaped the
petitioners’ new strategies.
Over the next year, both the PHRC and the SDP appealed the case to
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.122 Both petitions were denied a
hearing before the Supreme Court in June 1993, and the parties returned
to Judge Smith’s court.123 The SDP then took advantage of Judge Smith’s
new perspective on the standards for proving desegregation, and in
November 1993 moved for a directed verdict that the District had not
failed to achieve maximum possible desegregation.124 In particular, the
SDP argued that neither the Commission nor the intervenors had presented
evidence of busing, school pairings, magnet schools, or any other
strategies that would have been effective in decreasing segregation.125
Moreover, the District reiterated that it was financially unable to pursue
desegregation strategies.126 As such, the SDP suggested “this lengthy
litigation should be ended by the Court once and for all.”127

115. HRC V, 651 A.2d 177 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
116. Id. at 183–84.
117. Id. at 184–85.
118. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act of 1955 (PHRA), Pub. L. No. 744, Pa. Laws 222
(codified as amended at 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951–963 (West 2017)).
119. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
120. E.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
121. See HRC V, 651 A.2d.
122. See Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC VI), 638 A.2d 304 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1994).
123. Id. at 306.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 308.
126. Id. at 306.
127. Id. at 308.
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Although Judge Smith’s weariness of the ongoing battle was
beginning to show, she denied the request for a directed verdict.128 In
addition to questioning the extent of possible desegregation, Judge Smith
also heard arguments as to whether the SDP provided equal educational
opportunities to minority students.129 The SDP claimed that there was no
evidence of correlation between segregation and a racial achievement gap,
a claim that Judge Smith forcefully rejected by opining, “the Court
categorically rejects the School District’s assertion that disparities in
educational achievement are irrelevant. To the contrary, disparities in
educational achievement of students within the School District are one of
the paramount and most fundamental issues presented in this case.”130
Judge Smith again asserted the issue of quality education as the principal
question as opposed to aiming to desegregate the Philadelphia public
schools, which framed the case quite differently. Judge Smith, thereafter,
upheld the Commission’s authority to correct de facto segregation, as well
as its right to use race-based student assignments to do so.131 Indeed, she
noted the SDP “has a legal responsibility and duty to take steps to correct
the condition [of school segregation], and its failure to do so constitutes a
violation of the Human Relations Act.”132 Moreover, she noted that the
holdings of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, Freeman v. Pitt, and
Milliken I still allow state courts to remedy de facto segregation.133
However, Judge Smith reaffirmed her earlier ruling against busing,
finding that there was no new evidence to establish its feasibility as a
means to decrease segregation.134 In addition, testimony was presented and
Judge Smith focused on evidence of unequal educational opportunities
over evidence of segregation.135 Her summary of the PHRC’s arguments,
for example, sets aside the complaints of segregation and emphasized
quality education:
Despite the Commission’s continued concern for further integration
of the School District’s schools through mandatory measures, the
Commission also recognizes that disparate educational opportunities
must also be addressed, and emphasizes that an important element of

128. Id. at 307.
129. Id. at 308.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 309.
132. Id. at 311.
133. Id. at 310–11.
134. Id. at 328 (ordering the litigants to pursue equal educational opportunities for students in
racially isolated schools).
135. Id. at 315–19.
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any school desegregation case . . . [is to] guarantee a more equitable
outcome in terms of student achievement.136

Thus, the PHRC had begun to shift its arguments in response to Judge
Smith’s leads, balancing desegregation strategies with achievement goals.
ASPIRA also heavily emphasized inequities, citing “fewer resources
including, among other things, less experienced and less highly rated
teachers, older school facilities requiring greater repair, fewer dollars spent
on educational improvement in these schools” and limited school choices
for minority students, resulted in lower standardized test scores and lower
graduation rates in the School District of Philadelphia.137 In response, the
SDP maintained its claim that any further desegregation efforts would be
counterproductive, as it had already achieved maximum possible
desegregation.138 The SDP cited low funds, union restrictions, and the
additional needs of minority and low-income students as constraints on its
ability to use funds to improve student achievement.139
To assess these claims, Judge Smith examined the results of an
integration plan crafted in the mid-1980s, specifically focusing on the
“educational improvement” components, explaining that “the Court must
and shall look to student achievement results, among other things, to
determine whether an equal educational opportunity has been made
available to all students within the public schools.”140 Judge Smith noted
racial gaps in test scores across grades and subjects, as well as in grades,
graduation rates, and access to Advanced Placement courses.141 She
concluded that the results
unequivocally support[] the contention [of the petitioners] . . . race is
a factor with regard to the levels of academic achievement even
correlating for other variables . . . . Thus the parties have sustained
their burden of showing that race is a significant factor in the
achievement gaps which continue to widen . . . .142

Yet, Judge Smith also described the findings of researchers and district
staff, who highlighted highly segregated schools that still fostered high
levels of academic achievement.143 She concluded that with a strong
culture of achievement and high expectations for students, schools could

136. Id. at 311.
137. Id. at 312.
138. Id. at 312–13.
139. Id. at 313.
140. Id. at 319.
141. Id. at 317–18.
142. Id. at 320.
143. Id. at 308.

2017]

Examining the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case

1071

overcome the obstacles of segregation and poverty.144 In other words,
Judge Smith equated the fact that because some students overcame the
effects of segregation, therefore, all students facing segregation have the
ability to overcome the same.
Given the gap between examples of successful schools and the
average performance of segregated schools, Judge Smith determined that
the “overall implementation [of the Modified Plan] has been
ineffective . . . . [A]ll available measures or strategies have either not been
considered or implemented by the School District which could enhance
integration of its students and eliminate the racial disparities in
achievements.”145 Judge Smith listed additional strategies for decreasing
segregation, including new school construction and strategies for raising
the academic achievement of minority students, such as strong preschool
programs, extended school years, and collaboration with community
groups.146 Unfortunately, the SDP’s actions had been counterproductive
and even directly opposed to these goals. Ultimately, Judge Smith
concluded,
[T]he School District has failed to desegregate the public schools by
all feasible means and continue[d] to maintain a racially segregated
school environment where all of the students do not receive equal
educational opportunities or a quality education . . . . Consequently,
the Commission’s petition to enforce the law is granted.147

She ordered the SDP and the PHRC to “discuss the process for
development of a desegregation plan and timetable for
implementation.”148 Judge Smith specified elements to be included in the
plan, namely steps to improve the academic achievement of minority
students.149 The only elements she named to improve desegregation were
voluntary school choice measures and the suggestion that new schools be
constructed in naturally integrated neighborhoods, somewhat tentative
measures compared to her extensive list of strategies focused on
achievement.150

144. Id. at 317.
145. Id. at 326.
146. Id. at 326–27. Suggesting this list was a precursor of the ultimate consent decree; the list
included a vast focus on things like discipline, professional development and separate but equal
facilities.
147. Id. at 328.
148. Id. at 329.
149. Id. at 326–27.
150. Id. at 328.
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Subsequent proceedings reinforced Judge Smith’s focus on academic
achievement.151 Based on testimony by the superintendent and other
district staff, research on urban school districts, and recent federal
legislation, Judge Smith emphasized the goal of “reinvesting in public
school education where the focus is on high academic achievement of all
students.”152 Judge Smith partly accepted the first proposal, which was
submitted in November 1994.153 Judge Smith approved recommendations
for professional development, improved school climate, stringent
discipline, and monitoring; she partially approved recommendations for
organizational restructuring, facilities, and for use of resources.154 In
addition, Judge Smith ordered that the SDP develop plans to promote
school safety, parental involvement, and “strong basic educational
skills.”155 Moreover, for the first time, Judge Smith explicitly
acknowledged the retrenchment of efforts toward desegregation.156
Development and implementation of the plan proved to be a battle in
its own right. First, the SDP applied for a stay of Judge Smith’s order,
which Judge Smith denied in January 1995.157 The PHRC then challenged
the District’s plan in April 1995, causing Judge Smith to reaffirm her
requirements.158 She reiterated the need for parental involvement, but also
added requirements for curriculum revision and a new equity formula
taking into account a school’s status as racially isolated for purposes of
resource allocation.159 Rather than seeking desegregation, Judge Smith
sought to take intractable segregation into account and still improve
educational outcomes.160 In June 1995, Judge Smith again ordered specific
improvements to the plan, which called for measures to provide
professional development, curb absenteeism, and invite community input
into a restructuring plan.161
151. E.g., Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC VII), 651 A.2d 186 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1994); Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC IX), 658 A.2d 470
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
152. HRC VII, 651 A.2d at 187.
153. Id. at 189.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 188–93.
156. Id. at 188 (“Likewise, no amount of reform strategies or additional financial resources can
effectively alter the status quo unless those persons central to the reform effort are committed to
making it work.”). Judge Smith’s quote foreshadowed the defeat of the state-based movement toward
desegregation.
157. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC VIII), 654 A.2d 96 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1995).
158. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC X), 658 A.2d 470 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1995).
159. Id. at 475.
160. Id.
161. HRC X, 658 A.2d at 474–76.
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As the plan developed and the SDP was forced to implement
additional provisions, the District sought funding to execute the new
requirements.162 In 1996, Judge Smith at last granted the SDP’s request to
join the Commonwealth, the Governor, the City of Philadelphia, and the
mayor in order to determine funding liability.163 Judge Smith concluded
that the PHRA required the Commonwealth, but not the city, to fund
remedial orders.164 The Commonwealth and the Governor appealed to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for relief in 1999, and Judge Smith’s
joinder decision was vacated.165 The SDP, then, was left with a new series
of requirements but no new funding, support, or enforcement powers. As
the 1990s drew to a close, so did the lengthy litigation. The SDP developed
a new plan focused on educational improvement rather than desegregation,
guided predominately by Judge Smith. Neither the city nor the state was
willing to or required to fund the new plan, leaving doubts about its
feasibility and efficacy. But the fate of the case was sealed and hardly
recognizable to the parties that started the case more than two decades ago.
E. Placing the Proverbial Nail in the State Law-Based Desegregation
Coffin: The Case of the School District of Philadelphia in the 2000s
After a protracted battle over the design of the new plan, the SDP’s
Comprehensive Safety and Security Plan and Curriculum Renewal Plan
were approved in 2001.166 Judge Smith found that the plans sufficiently
addressed historical discrimination while providing minority students with
equal educational opportunities.167 At long last, the court was satisfied that
the SDP had made significant efforts and taken all feasible steps to
improve education for minority students in segregated schools. The School
Safety and Security Plan, based on input from other large urban districts,
constituted a “comprehensive approach to school safety.”168
Measures to improve school climate included security technology,
systematic collection of school discipline data, and professional
development on juvenile justice issues.169 Racially isolated schools were
to have first priority, but the plan was to be phased in throughout the
162. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC XI), 667 A.2d 1173 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995).
163. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC XII), 681 A.2d 1366, 1389 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1996).
164. Id. at 1366.
165. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC XIII), 732 A.2d 578 (Pa. 1999).
166. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC XIV), 784 A.2d 266 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2001).
167. Id. at 266.
168. Id. at 270.
169. Id. at 271.
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District over two years.170 The plan also specified target outcomes,
including increased involvement of parents and community partners,
decreased absenteeism, a revised Code of Student Conduct, data
collection, and audit procedures.171 The Curriculum Renewal Plan further
called for the District to develop and implement academic standards in
core subjects in order to “foster uniformity in instructional practices and
district-wide coordination in instruction and assessment.”172 The plan
promised extensive professional development that was focused on helping
special education students in the general classroom.173 Target outcomes
for the Curriculum Renewal Plan included reevaluation of textbooks and
assessments, regular meetings to review student achievement data, and
targeted professional development.174
Finally, Judge Smith ordered full-day kindergarten for eligible
students in segregated schools, literacy interns in elementary schools, and
school councils in segregated schools.175 Although segregated and racially
isolated schools were repeatedly mentioned, there were no plans to
decrease segregation.176 Judge Smith’s order, which was nearly devoid of
a focus on desegregation of the Philadelphia public schools, betrayed the
origins of the lengthy case. However, Judge Smith ordered the PHRC to
monitor the implementation of the various plans and requested closure of
the case when it was satisfied with the District’s implementation.177 Thus,
the case began to wind down and responsibility passed back from the
Court to the SDP and the PHRC.
The case formally ended in 2009 when the SDP, the PHRC, and
ASPIRA reached a consent agreement.178 Judge Smith dismissed the case
with prejudice because the PHRC had withdrawn its complaint. The
agreement was based on a five-year strategic plan entitled “Imagine
2014.”179 Imagine 2014 was designed to raise academic achievement of
minority students so that every child in every Philadelphia classroom
received an excellent education.180 The SDP identified five priorities that
would help achieve this goal: quality instruction, school choice, excellent
170. Id. at 274.
171. HRC XIV, 784 A.2d 266, 275 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
172. Id. at 271.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 273.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. HRC XIV, 784 A.2d 266, 275 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
178. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 1056 C.D. 1973, slip op. at 1 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. July 13, 2009) (consent order settling the case), http://www.philasd.org/desegregation/
image-Img8C2B_1248206855.pdf [https://perma.cc/LLP8-DYQ9].
179. Id. at 4, 6–7.
180. Id. at 6.

2017]

Examining the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case

1075

staff, accountability, and improved facilities and operations.181 The
Philadelphia School Desegregation Case ended without mention of
desegregation of the city’s schools. At long last, the Philadelphia School
Desegregation Case had come to mirror Milliken I and II—school
desegregation was no longer a sought after remedy.182 The case was now
about providing students of racial and ethnic minority backgrounds with a
quality education, even if that had to occur in segregated schools.
III. MAKING THE CASE: ALIGNING PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS
COMMISSION V. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA WITH THE
GENERATIONAL CHANGES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES
The Philadelphia School Desegregation Case took a variety of turns
over its nearly forty-year history. In the 1970s, the case enjoyed general
success with judges who seemingly sympathized with desegregation
efforts.183 However, in the late 1970s, the case saw the beginnings of a
backlash against desegregation efforts, and this backlash led to an era of
hostility toward integration efforts in the 1980s.184 The 1980s gave way to
the 1990s when the case met new participants in terms of judiciary and
plaintiffs.185 These new additions facilitated the resolution of the case but
only after the purpose of the case shifted from desegregation to equal
educational opportunities. In the 2000s, the case reached a resolution that
focused heavily on offering minority students in Philadelphia an
opportunity that matched those afforded to their White counterparts.186
This resolution became known as Imagine 2014 and purported to offer five
targeted improvements to the quality of education to Philadelphia’s
minority students.187
New stakeholders, such as Judge Smith and ASPIRA, influenced the
outcome of the case. Both the duration of the case and the additions in the
1990s to the plaintiffs and the judiciary played key roles in reshaping the
181. HRC VII, 651 A.2d 186, 189–95 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
182. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (severely limiting the abilities of inner city school
districts to include suburban school districts in desegregation plans); see also Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267
(1977) (creating equal educational access, even if in segregated schools, as a remedy in lieu of school
desegregation).
183. See HRC IV, 443 A.2d 1343 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982); HRC IV, 390 A.2d 1238 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1978); HRC III, 374 A.2d 1014 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977); HRC II, 352 A.2d 200 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1976); HRC I, 294 A.2d 156 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973); HRC I, 294 A.2d 410 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
184. See HRC IV, 443 A.2d 1343; HRC III, 374 A.2d 1014; Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v.
Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Norristown Sch. Dist., 374 A.2d 671 (1977).
185. See supra notes 94–165 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 166–184 and accompanying text.
187. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 1056 C.D. 1973, slip op. at 4 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. July 13, 2009) (consent order settling the case), http://www.philasd.org/desegregation/
image-Img8C2B_1248206855.pdf [https://perma.cc/LLP8-DYQ9].
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Philadelphia School Desegregation Case. First, the duration of the case
allowed for the outcomes to be shaped by prevailing trends in school
desegregation, especially trends influenced by the federal courts’ holdings
in school desegregation cases. Table 8 lists the changes in the Philadelphia
School Desegregation Case within the context of the four generations of
federal school desegregation cases.
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Table 8
Timeline of Desegregation Eras for Federal Cases and
Pennsylvania State Case
Generation of Cases
First Generation:
The Road to
Desegregation
Second Generation:
Desegregation by
Mandate
Third Generation:
Manifestation of
Waning Support of
Desegregation

Fourth Generation:
Explicit Return to
“Separate but
Equal”

Federal
Sipuel (1948); Sweatt
(1950); McLaurin
(1950); Brown I (1954);
Brown II (1955)188
Cooper (1958); Griffin
(1964); Green (1968);
Swann (1971)190
Wright v. Council of
Emporia (1972) and
United States v. Scotland
Neck City Board of
Education (1972);
Milliken I (1974);
Milliken II (1977);
Dowell (1991); Freeman
(1992)192
Aftermath of Dowell
(1991) and Freeman
(1992)194

Pennsylvania
Ending with the passage
of the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act in
1955 (PHRA)189
SDP v. PHRC (HRC I)
(1972) 
PHRC v. SDP (HRC II)
(1976)191
PHRC v. SDP (HRC II)
(1976) 
PHRC v. SDP (HRC XII)
(1996)193

PHRC v. SDP (2001);
PHRC v. SDP (2009)
(consent order); to
current195

188. Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
189. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act of 1955 (PHRA), Pub. L. No. 744, Pa. Laws 222
(codified as amended at 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951–963 (West 2017)).
190. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377
U.S. 218 (1964); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
191. HRC I, 294 A.2d 156 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973); HRC II, 352 A.2d 200 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1976).
192. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); U.S. v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Ed., 407
U.S. 484 (1972); Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Bd. of Educ. of
Okl. Cty Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
193. HRC I, 294 A.2d 410; HRC XII, 681 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
194. Freeman, 503 U.S. 467; Dowell, 498 U.S. 237.
195. HRC XIV, 784 A.2d 266 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch.
Dist. of Phila., No. 1056 C.D. 1973, (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 13, 2009) (consent order settling the case),
http://www.philasd.org/desegregation/image-Img8C2B_1248206855.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LLP8DYQ9].

1078

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:1049

A. New Stakeholders, Altering Results: The Impact of
Judge Smith and ASPIRA
The addition of new stakeholders proved to be pivotal to the outcome
of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case.196 Judge Smith
immediately expressed her desire to establish equal educational
opportunities and reverse decades of precedent grounded in theories
advocating the necessity of school integration. Her efforts to offer quality
education to all students (instead of fully integrating the Philadelphia
public schools) were steeped in attacks on the credibility of the PHRC’s
evidence. Citing erroneous information about transportation times, the
judge effectively foreclosed one of the primary apparatuses for achieving
desegregation: busing. Furthermore, Judge Smith made clear that an
acceptable integration plan would be evaluated by the opportunities to
achieve academic success. Several hearings and proceedings were
dedicated to drafting the SDP’s plans for desegregating Philadelphia’s
public schools. While these plans often mentioned desegregation, their
core focused on offering minority students an education that was
comparable to their White counterparts. There were no plans that explicitly
described how students in Philadelphia public schools would ultimately
attend desegregated schools.
ASPIRA’s involvement in the lawsuit gave the PHRC a national
organization with national resources. ASPIRA’s strategy mirrored that of
Judge Smith. ASPIRA’s complaint focused on a lack of resources and
opportunities. Judge Smith was sympathetic to these complaints in the way
that the earlier judges were sympathetic to the PHRC’s complaints. PHRC
must have realized that joining forces with ASPIRA and Judge Smith
would create a three-to-one advantage at the negotiating table. Judge
Smith constantly and often resoundingly denied arguments against
potential school desegregation; thus, PHRC had almost no choice other
than joining the equal educational opportunities bandwagon. The
Commission faced either a complete loss of quality education for students
in Philadelphia or offering those same students at least some semblance of
a quality education in their current environments. ASPIRA’s introduction
as a plaintiff helped create this shift in the potential outcomes.
B. The Impact of Time: Aligning the Generational Changes
in Federal and State Desegregation Cases
The notion of a four-decade legal case is overwhelming. The wheels
of justice may turn slowly but seldom as slowly as they did in the
Philadelphia School Desegregation Case. Comparing the decisions of the
196. Supra notes 94–165 and accompanying text.
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case with their contemporary national court cases and school
desegregation trends, it can be seen that the Philadelphia School
Desegregation Case was highly influenced by the prevailing attitudes
toward school desegregation. At times when the nation—or at least the
nation’s courts—was pro-integration, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania appeared to be very pro-integration. Following decisions
such as Green197 and Swann,198 the PHRC found favor with the court. The
court seemed to rule in favor of the PHRC at every ruling during the early
1970s. In the early to mid-1970s, the Commonwealth Court often went as
far as demanding that the SDP make every effort to integrate the
Philadelphia public schools, notwithstanding the expenses involved.
However, as the 1970s ended and the decade changed, the country
tired of desegregation efforts. This attitude affected the decisions of the
Commonwealth Court. Post-Milliken,199 it became clear that efforts at
desegregating the country’s public schools would have boundaries. The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania established those boundaries by
reining in the previous desegregation demands in the late 1970s and
ultimately offering great latitude to the SDP in the 1980s—despite
evidence that the school district, when left to its own devices, further
segregated the Philadelphia public schools. The 1990s presented new
challenges as the country believed that integration would not work. This
philosophy found its way to the courtrooms of the Commonwealth Court.
Recall that Judge Smith, in the early 1990s, shifted the focus of the case.
No longer was desegregation a critical part of the case; the new issue was
whether minority students had equal access to quality learning
opportunities in Philadelphia’s public schools.
The Philadelphia School Desegregation Case, a state law-based
desegregation case, paralleled the trajectory of federally based
desegregation cases. The Pennsylvania state legislature passed the PHRA
in 1955.200 Not coincidentally, the PHRA arose during the heyday of
efforts to end segregation and advance movements toward equity for racial
and ethnic minorities.201 The PHRA afforded the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania an opportunity to explicitly address issues of segregation in
public accommodations. In fact, the PHRA was much broader than the

197. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
198. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
199. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
200. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act of 1955 (PHRA), Pub. L. No. 744, Pa. Laws 222
(codified as amended at 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951–963 (West 2017)).
201. The Pennsylvania State Legislature passed the PHRA just a year after the Court’s decision
in Brown I (1954) and in the same year as the Court’s decision in Brown II (1955), which reasserted a
federal commitment to ending segregation in public places.
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Court’s mandates in Brown I and Brown II because the PHRA explicitly
allowed for the state to address de facto as well as de jure segregation.
The lengthy Philadelphia School Desegregation Case can be
compared with the second generation of federal desegregation cases.
During the years immediately following Brown I and Brown II, the
Philadelphia School Desegregation Case enjoyed persistent and
consistent attacks on school desegregation; the state court judges from the
case’s origin to about the mid-1970s accepted few, if any, arguments from
the SDP on its inability to desegregate public schools. At one point, the
school district maintained that the desegregation of its public schools was
not financially feasible. The state courts rebuffed this argument, requiring
that the school district pursue the desegregation of its public schools
notwithstanding the alleged financial peril that such desegregation would
create for the SDP. In particular, the second generation of federal school
desegregation cases included cases such as Cooper v. Aaron (1958),
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County (1964), Green
v. County School Board of New Kent County (1968), and Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education (1971).202 In each of these
cases, school districts argued that the desegregation of the districts’
schools was either financially or politically unfeasible; in each of those
cases, the federal courts—just as the state court in the Philadelphia School
Desegregation Case—claims fell on deaf ears. Thus, neither the
Pennsylvania state court nor the United States Supreme Court would
accept any defiance of its order to desegregate public schools.
The third generation of federal school desegregation cases resulted
in the retrenchment of the federal courts’ efforts toward desegregation; the
same was true of the Pennsylvania state courts. During the third
generation203 of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case, the
Pennsylvania state courts relaxed their no excuses approach to school
desegregation and began to reason with the school district about the
feasibility of desegregating the public schools. In the most glaring segment
of this phase of litigation, the state court entertained whether the school
district could afford to desegregate its public schools. However, the state
court mandated that the school district produce some plan to allow for an
202. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd.
of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218
(1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
203. The third generation of school desegregation cases commenced with the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) and United States v. Scotland Neck
Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972). The third generation of school desegregation cases included
Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) and Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The third generation of school
desegregation cases concluded with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992), and Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
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assessment of the true cost of desegregating the district’s schools. Further,
the Pennsylvania state courts were unwilling to even entertain the idea of
costliness; the state courts demanded desegregation of Philadelphia’s
public schools irrespective of the cost. Federal school desegregation cases
were experiencing waning judicial support while the Philadelphia School
Desegregation Case was enduring its loss of support.
At that time, the Court narrowly sustained desegregation in cases
such as Wright v. Council of Emporia and United States v. Scotland Neck
City Board of Education.204 The Court decided both Council of Emporia205
and Scotland Neck206 by 5–4 majorities as opposed to the unanimity
enjoyed in the first generation of federal school desegregation cases. The
third generation of federal school desegregation cases hit its stride with the
Court’s decision in Milliken I, effectively issuing White suburban parents
a veto against school desegregation.207 The Court’s decision in Milliken I
made clear that parents seeking to avoid desegregated schools could
simply move immediately outside of district boundaries to maintain
segregated schools. Not surprisingly, Philadelphia (and other cities) faced
increased White flight and denser minority populations within urban
school districts post-Milliken I. Milliken I was most effective at preventing
desegregation because the case substantially limited the number of White
students available for desegregation efforts while simultaneously banning
school districts from reaching across district boundaries to capture those
parents who had now fled to the suburbs.
In its fourth generation of school desegregation case law, the
Philadelphia School Desegregation Case followed the fourth generation
of federal desegregation cases. This generation of cases was marked by
diminished resolve to desegregate public schools, or desegregation fatigue
and, most importantly, an apparent acceptance of segregated schools. In
many ways, the fourth generation of school desegregation cases at both
levels was a return to separate but equal. Federal school desegregation
cases, namely Freeman v. Pitts208 and Board of Education of Oklahoma
City v. Dowell,209 stalled attempts at school desegregation. In fact, Orfield
argued that the 1990s would go on to excuse school districts from
desegregation and allow the resegregation of public schools in previously
court-monitored school districts.210
204. Wright, 407 U.S.; Scotland Neck, 407 U.S.
205. Wright, 407 U.S.
206. Id.
207. See James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635
(2004).
208. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
209. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
210. Turning Back to Segregation, supra note 28.
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Similarly, this phase of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case
dismissed desegregation as a viable option for advancing educational
equity. Instead of school desegregation, Judge Smith set forth equal
educational opportunities or a modern version of separate but equal. The
Civil Rights Project has found that public schools in the United States are
as segregated now as schools were in 1968.211 Similarly, the schools are
still segregated in Philadelphia. As such, one could conclude that the state
and federally based school desegregation cases followed similar pathways
and produced similar results. Moreover, there is little to suggest that equal
educational opportunities in segregated schools have assisted the academic
growth of the students of the SDP.
CONCLUSION
The Philadelphia School Desegregation Case can be divided into
four phases with each running almost conterminously with a decade. The
case’s final outcome can be attributed to two factors. First, the introduction
of like-minded new stakeholders from the judiciary and the general public
led to a movement away from desegregation and toward equal educational
opportunities within segregated schools. Likewise, the case’s near-fourdecade duration made the case more susceptible to changing national and
federal views on school integration that became increasingly unpopular.
Although it is not possible, given the scope of this study, to articulate the
origins of shifting public discourse and thoughts on school desegregation
efforts, there appears to be a correlation between the manner in which the
federal courts and the Pennsylvania state court handled school
desegregation cases. Although the federal courts often handled cases
pertaining to de jure segregation and the Pennsylvania state court handled
a case pertaining to de facto segregation, the lineages of the cases appear
on their face to have progressed identically. The addition of new and
powerful stakeholders and the protracted nature of the Philadelphia
School Desegregation Case effectively allowed for the shifting of aims of
the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case and, more importantly,
curtailed the possibility that students in Philadelphia’s public schools
would eventually attend integrated schools.
The Philadelphia School Desegregation Case provides one example
of the impact of the federal court system on state court systems,
notwithstanding widely variant designs of desegregation statutes. In some
ways, the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case calls into question the
fidelity maintained—or not maintained—in the shared federalism
assumed among the federal and state governments in the United States.
211. A Critical Race Theory Analysis, supra note 2.
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Likewise, the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case provides a glaring
example of the dangers of state involvement in governmental and civil
rights affairs thought to be the province of the federal government.
Unfortunately, the result of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case
suggests that state legislative involvement in desegregation may not be the
great progressive hope that we desire in terms of racial and educational
equity. Further, there is little, if any, hope that federal interventions in
school desegregation will enhance movements toward racial
desegregation as a means to educational equity given the development of
federal case law. It is worth returning to the discussion of Sheff212 in this
context; some states have been better than others at pursuing racial
desegregation as a means of achieving educational equity. As new
paradigms in education, law, policy, and politics embrace segregative
mechanisms,213 it is important that scholars and practitioners assess the
ability of differing judicial systems to maintain separate, yet coexisting,
systems of judgment and avoid preemption in the articulation of decisions
addressing civil rights.

212. Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
213. Erica Frankenberg et al., Choice Without Equity: Charter School Segregation, 19 EDUC.
POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (2011), http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/download/779/878
[https://perma.cc/8A39-ZQS5] (finding that the charter school movement has contributed to the
resegregation of public schools). Charter schools do not merely aid in the resegregation of students.
Literature exists that suggests that students and parents of students enrolled in charter schools have
less political power due to the disproportionate appointment of White Americans on charter school
boards. See Steven L. Nelson, Gaining “Choice” and Losing Voice, in ONLY IN NEW ORLEANS:
SCHOOL CHOICE AND EQUITY POST-HURRICANE KATRINA 237, 246–47 (Luis Mirón et al. eds., 2015).
See also Steven L. Nelson & Heather N. Bennett, Are Black Parents Locked out of Challenging
Disproportionately Low Charter School Board Representation? Assessing the Role of the Federal
Courts in Building a House of Cards, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 153 (2016). This lack of
political power has, in some cases, had negative impacts on student achievement. See Steven L.
Nelson, Killing Two Achievements with One Stone: The Intersectional Impact of Shelby County on the
Rights to Vote and High Performing Schools, 13 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 225 (2016)) and
increased access points to the school-to-prison pipeline (see Steven L. Nelson & Jennifer E. Grace,
The Right to Remain Silent in New Orleans: The Role of Self-Selected Charter School Boards on the
School-to-Prison Pipeline, 40 NOVA L. REV. 447 (2016); Steven L. Nelson, Racial Subjugation by
Another Name? Using the Links in the School-to-Prison Pipeline to Reassess State Takeover District
Performance, 9 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 1 (2017)).

